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Abstract
Counter to the credit channel of monetary transmission, monetary policy
tightening induces a rise in lending by two different types of non-bank financial
institutions (NBFI): shadow banks and investment funds. A monetary DSGE
model is able to replicate the empirical facts when augmented with interme-
diaries that allow for regulatory arbitrage on the one hand, and household
portfolio rebalancing on the other. Therefore NBFI reduce the effectiveness of
the bank lending channel, which posits a decrease in bank lending following
monetary tightening. Given the pending regulation of the financial system, I
study how regulation of the shadow banking sector may affect the monetary
transmission mechanism, especially during a zero lower bound (ZLB) episode.
I find that bringing shadow banks back onto the balance sheets of commercial
banks is beneficial for consumption smoothing. Alternatively, regulating them
like investment funds results in a milder recession during, and a quicker escape
from, the ZLB. This is because a large demand shock that moves the economy
to the ZLB acts in a similar way to a monetary tightening due to the inability
to lower the policy rate to the unconstrained level. Consequently, the bank
lending channel becomes operational and its effectiveness can be reduced via
less reliance on deposit funding.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy makers have been faced with a reduced ability to lower policy rates
due to the Zero Lower bound (ZLB). At the same time, a regulatory overhaul is un-
derway that is aimed at stabilizing the financial sector. One focus of regulation has
been on the shadow banking sector1, which has seen a reduction in credit intermedi-
ation by 50% since the financial crisis (see Figure 9 in Appendix C). The regulatory
community is likely to regulate the financial system in a way that will make it less
likely that shadow banks will play a crucial role going forward (Claessens et al.,
2012). This paper analyzes which shadow banking regulations are most helpful at
escaping the ZLB.
In this paper, I argue that a recession at the ZLB is milder and shorter lasting
if the credit system is less bank based. This argument is based on the empirical
observation that banks decrease lending in response to monetary tightening, while
non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) increase lending. A monetary DSGE model
with different financial intermediaries is able to replicate and explain these results.
For banks, the lending channel becomes operational: monetary tightening results in
an outflow of loanable funds, leading commercial banks to reduce lending. Shadow
banks are used by commercial banks to circumvent capital restrictions and increase
lending. Households substitute savings out of bank deposits and into higher yielding
liabilities of investment funds2, which will increase lending.3
I show that during a ZLB environment the bank lending channel is operational,
because the lower bound on monetary policy prohibits short term rates from falling to
the level that would be chosen with unconstrained monetary policy. The mechanics of
the ZLB therefore resemble a monetary policy tightening: Households prefer higher
yielding assets to deposits, which activates the bank lending channel. If the financial
sector can substitute into non-deposit funding, the bank lending channel is weakened
and credit tightening is dampened.
I take a standard monetary DSGE model and embed a financial sector that is able
to replicate key empirical impulse response functions and aggregate business cycle
statistics. I conduct counterfactual analyses in which shadow banks are eliminated
from the model. Since the fundamentals of the real economy are not affected by
the configuration of the financial system, credit demand from the real sector stays
1Shadow banks are ABS Issuers, Financing Companies, Funding Corporations and Security
Brokers and Dealers. Their fixed income private credit intermediation, which is defined as loans,
bonds and commercial paper, totaled about 35% of all credit to the economy before the 2008
financial crisis. This group’s common characteristic is that they occupy a central place in the
internal functioning of financial markets between other financial institutions. Households typically
do not fund shadow banks directly.
2Investment funds are mutual funds and money market funds. Although less visible than com-
mercial banks, before the financial crisis these institutions channeled about 25% of private credit to
the real sector, and they have grown since then. Investment funds are investment vehicles directly
accessible to households and therefore feature in household savings decisions.
3Other sectors that hold large credit volumes are insurance and pension funds. These institutions
fulfil different economic functions compared to pure lenders and would complicate the analysis, and
therefore are not considered in this paper.
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constant and will either be filled by commercial bank credit or investment fund credit.
This discussion is crucial for regions currently assessing different regulatory systems,
as for example in the European Union, where the Capital Markets Union proposal
suggests a move away from a bank-dependent financial system to a more capital
markets based system.
I contribute to the existing literature in the following three ways: i) by explaining
and replicating the empirical behavior of NBFI to monetary policy in a monetary
DSGE model; ii) by likening the behavior of economies at the ZLB to a response to
monetary tightening; and iii) by analyzing the effects of financial regulations that
are most helpful in escaping the ZLB on nominal interest rates. To do so, I develop a
search and matching mechanism that allows households to make investment choices
between debt and equity in a linear approximation.
There are a number of papers focusing on different aspects of shadow banking.
Meeks et al. (2014) analyze financial stability and consider shadow banks as off-
balance sheet vehicles of commercial banks to unload risky loans. Verona et al. (2013)
study adverse effects of excessively easy monetary policy and understand shadow
banks as financial intermediaries specializing in less risky loans akin to bond issuance
by investment banks. Moreira and Savov (2014) analyze the way in which shadow
bank liability liquidity characteristics change over the business cycle. Goodhart
et al. (2012) study different regulatory regimes to stop fire sales by shadow banks
and take the opposite view to Verona et al., considering shadow banks to be less risk
averse, but still funded by the commercial banking sector, comparable to off-balance
sheet vehicles as in Meeks et al. Gertler et al. (2016) focus on the role of wholesale
banking in transmitting crises to the real sector. I do not look at crisis periods and
the accompanying effects of fire sales, bankruptcy and regime transition. Instead, I
focus on business cycle consequences of different financial system configurations after
they have been implemented.
In the next section, I describe the model with three types of intermediaries and
the incorporation of a savings decision by households. Section 3 contains the model
analysis, including calibration and Bayesian estimation, impulse response functions
to monetary policy shocks and business cycle effects of eliminating shadow banking.
Section 4 contains the ZLB analysis and reaction of the economy under different
financial sector configurations, as well as the comparison of a demand shock at the
ZLB to a monetary tightening. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to four different strands of the literature. First, the paper
relates to the credit channel of monetary policy. The credit channel posits that
following monetary tightening the amount of credit in an economy is reduced, which
amplifies traditional interest rate and asset price channels.4 This channel is split up
in the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel.5 The latter has often been
4For a simple exposition in the IS/LM framework, see Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
5See Bernanke and Gertler (1995). The balance sheet channel is underlying the financial accel-
erator as developed in Bernanke et al. (1999)
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challenged in light of banks’ abilities to substitute to non-deposit funding.6 However,
there is a large empirical literature that finds evidence for the bank lending channel.7
This paper introduces a mechanism that allows the financial sector to substitute into
other sources of funding and therefore decrease the effectiveness of the bank lending
channel.
The second strand of the literature analyzes monetary policy effectiveness. Over
the past several decades unexpected monetary policy shocks appear to have had less
and less of an influence on the real economy.8 This is sometimes explained by devel-
opments in capital and financial markets.9 This paper adds to the understanding of
how the financial market structure, especially its funding via savers, influences the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
Third, the paper adds to the understanding of economies that are constrained by
a ZLB. Although the theoretical idea has existed for some time10, empirical studies
were limited to the Japanese experience. Since the financial crisis of 2008, several
studies have focused on how an economy can escape the ZLB via fiscal policy or
unconventional monetary policy.11 This paper instead focuses on how the overall
composition of the financial sector facilitates resilience to the negative consequences
of the ZLB.
Lastly, the theoretical mechanism developed in this paper is related to the search
and matching literature. The initial development focused on explaining the dynamics
of the labor market and replicating key statistics.12 It has since found applications
to other markets, including money and credit relationships.13 Following Wasmer
and Weil (2004), I model funding market frictions analogously to those on the labor
market because of their comparable characteristics of ”moral hazard, heterogeneity
and specificity”. In contrast to Wasmer and Weil, in my model the amount of deposits
changes endogenously.
6Romer and Romer (1990) argue that bank loan supply is insulated from monetary policy if
banks can frictionlessly find non-depository funding.
7Early support from aggregate data comes from Kashyap et al. (1993). Identification issues,
however, necessitate more detailed data, which were advanced by Kashyap and Stein (1995).
8For an empirical exploration, see e.g., Primiceri (2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006). For a
structural explanation, see Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
9See Jermann and Quadrini (2006) and Dynan et al. (2006) as well as a critique by Haan and
Sterk (2011).
10See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for a theoretical treatment before the US experience.
11Christiano et al. (2011) explain why government spending at the ZLB can generally be larger
than 1, while Albertini and Poirier (2015) and Christiano et al. (2016) show potentially expan-
sionary effects of unemployment benefits. Gambacorta et al. (2014) explore the effectiveness of
unconventional monetary policy.
12The seminal paper is Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
13See den Haan et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) for early contributions and Gu et al.
(2016) and Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2015) for current applications.
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2 The baseline model economy
Although the financial sector has been incorporated into DSGE models recently, it
is still largely treated as a relatively homogeneous entity. However, empirical studies
indicate that different financial institutions react differently to economic shocks: In
Mazelis (2016), I find that two types of NBFI, shadow banks and investment funds,
increase lending after monetary tightening, while banks decrease lending (see Figure
1).
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Figure 1: Responses of intermediaries to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Source: Mazelis (2016). Note: Empirical impulse responses of the federal funds rate
and credit by commercial banks, investment funds and shadow banks to an unantic-
ipated 100 basis point increase in the federal funds rate. Data for the latter three
are from the Financial Accounts of the United States, 1984I:2006IV. Commercial
banks are US Depository Institutions and Credit Unions. Shadow banks are ABS
Issuers, Security Brokers and Dealers, Financing Companies and Funding Corpora-
tions. Investment funds are Mutual Funds and Money Market Funds. As a measure
of credit I include loans, bonds, and commercial paper. Identification of the shock
follows the recursiveness assumption of Christiano et al. (1999) with slow moving
variables ordered before the shock and credit after the shock. The horizontal axis
reports quarters since the shock. The vertical axis reports percentage deviations from
the unshocked path. Shaded regions are 32nd-68th and 5th-95th percentiles of 1000
draws. All variable responses are in Figure 10 in Appendix C.
I follow the call by Woodford (2010) for ”a framework for macroeconomic analysis
in which intermediation plays a crucial role and [...] which also takes account of the
fact that the U.S. financial sector is now largely market-based.” I employ a monetary
DSGE model with sluggish price setting to generate nominal frictions, as well as
financial frictions. The structure of the shadow banking sector and its relationship
to the rest of the financial sector is comparable to Meeks et al. (2014) and Gertler
et al. (2016). Debt and equity financing are modeled using two different types of
frictions. Debt financing via the moral hazard problem as in Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) guarantees that as long as the intermediary
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does not exceed a maximum amount of leverage per intermediary value, creditors are
indifferent towards the absolute amount of debt that they hold. Without explicitly
modeling it, this can be understood as deposit insurance for commercial banks and
pledged, or asset backed, debt for shadow banks.
Equity financing is risky. Since equity investors participate in the state-contingent
returns of the intermediary, households are only willing to hold equity claims that
have an underlying returns profile that fits into the individual household’s portfolio.
An equity return that is higher than the interest rate on debt captures this riskiness.
Although not modeled explicitly, this heterogeneity on the micro level is captured via
a search and matching mechanism: only a fraction of households agree to the terms
of the potential intermediaries that they meet on the equity funding market. This
allows me to solve the savings decision of households via a linear approximation.
SaversIntermediariesBorrowers
Households
Deposits
Fund 
Shares
Commercial Banks
Loans Deposits
CP Net Worth
Investment Funds
CP Fund 
SharesLoans
Goods Producers
Physical 
Capital
Loans 
(Banks)
Loans 
(Shadow 
Banks)
Loans 
(Funds)
Shadow Banks
Loans
CP
CP
Net Worth
Figure 2: Balance sheets of key agents in the economy. Note: In addition, the
economy is populated by capital producers and monopolistically competitive retailers.
A central bank is the source of monetary disturbances. CP = Commercial Paper.
In addition to the five agents shown in Figure 2, the economy is populated by
capital producers and monopolistically competitive retailers. A central bank con-
ducting monetary policy is the source of monetary disturbances and completes the
model.
2.1 Households
A continuum of households of measure one exists that consume, save in a portfolio
of assets and supply labor. They maximize discounted lifetime utility
max
{Ct,Lt,Dt,NIFt }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
i=0
βi
)[
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt
]
subject to the sequence of period budget constraints
Ct +D
e
t +N
IF
t = WtLt + Πt +RtD
e
t−1 +R
IF
t N
IF
t−1.
Each unit of labor Lt earns the real wage Wt. Πt are profits from ownership
of capital producers, retailers and financial intermediaries. βt is the time-varying
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discount factor, h is the habit parameter, χ is the relative utility weight of labor
and ϕ is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The asset portfolio consists of
deposits in commercial banks, Dt, and shares in investment funds, N
IF
t . On the micro
level, when a household wants to invest into shares, it enters the funding market and
randomly meets a potential investment fund. If the investment fund is a good fit
regarding individual portfolio characteristics, they invest and form a match. On the
macro level, this behavior is approximated by a search and matching mechanism.
We only observe a fraction ft of searching households establish a match. The end-
of-period deposits that remain in the portfolio after investment into fund shares are
then Det = Dt(1 − ft). The fraction ft is endogenously determined as explained in
Section 2.2.2. Investment funds pay a state-contingent interest rate RIFt , which is
above the risk-less real return Rt that banks pay on deposits. A fraction θIF of
households withdraws their existing fund investments every period, resulting in a
law of motion for fund shareholdings:
N IFt = θIFN
IF
t−1ξ
IF
t + ftDt. (1)
Reinvested fund shares might be affected by ξIFt , an autoregressive shock process
of order one and mean 1. With %t denoting marginal utility of consumption and
µt denoting the additional value of being invested in fund shares, the first order
conditions are given by
Consumption Ct : %t =
1
Ct − hCt−1 − Et
βt+1h
Ct+1 − hCt . (2)
Labor Lt : χL
ϕ
t = %tWt. (3)
Deposits Dt : %t = (1− ft)Etβt+1Rt+1%t+1 + ft(µt + %t). (4)
Fund Shares N IFt : µt + %t = Etβt+1
{
RIFt+1%t+1 + µt+1θIF ξ
IF
t+1
}
. (5)
The first order conditions for consumption and labor are standard. Equation (4)
reduces to the commonly known Euler condition in the case that fund investments
do not exist or have no additional value14, i.e., the household increases savings until
the marginal utility of consumption today equals the discounted expected marginal
utility of consumption tomorrow. If households can invest in fund shares, but their
ability to find a match is constrained (i.e., ft < 1), being invested in an investment
fund is valuable (i.e., µt > 0). The household therefore increases savings until the
marginal utility of consumption today equals the probability of consuming tomorrow
(1 − ft) times its value (the discounted expected marginal utility of consumption
tomorrow) plus the probability of investing in fund shares ft times that value.
The value of investing in fund shares is given by Equation (5). The right-hand side
can be rewritten to yield Etβt+1
{
rIFt+1%t+1 + (1− θIF )%t+1 + θIF (%t+1 + µt+1)
}
. The
first term denotes the per period net return rIFt+1 from fund share investments that
every investing household receives. The second term is the fraction of households
that redeem their fund shares and use them for current period consumption. A
fraction θIF of households stays invested in fund shares and will reap the value of
being invested one period hence, expressed in the last term.
14Iff µt = 0, Equation (4) holds for all ft.
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2.2 Financial Intermediaries
There are three types of intermediaries: Commercial banks, investment funds and
shadow banks. Commercial banks finance the real sector directly via loans and buy
shadow bank commercial paper. Investment funds finance loans to the real sector and
commercial paper in shadow banks via fund shares, which they sell to households.
They are not able to leverage their operations with debt. Shadow banks use their
funding to extend loans to the real sector.
2.2.1 Commercial Banks
There are infinitely many commercial banks in the economy, which are operated by
members of households. Each commercial bank can make loans SCBt to the real
sector that mature in one period and yield a return RKt+1. Every commercial bank
can also extend credit to the shadow banking sector, which is called commercial
paper. Commercial paper MCBt is different from regular loans, because it denotes a
claim on a pool of loans managed by the shadow bank and yields a return RMCBt+1 .
The commercial bank funds these claims via net worth NCBt and deposits Dt that
it receives from other households (excluding the household that it is managed by).
The balance sheet of a commercial bank is then
QtS
CB
t +M
CB
t = N
CB
t +Dt (6)
where Qt denotes the price of physical capital. The commercial bank accumulates
earnings net of the interest Rt that it pays out to depositors one period hence:
NCBt = R
K
t+1QtS
CB
t +R
MCB
t+1 M
CB
t −Rt+1Dt. (7)
Each commercial bank has a finite life time and exits the market with a probability
θCB each period. Once the commercial bank exits, it pays out accumulated lifetime
earnings to the household whose member was its manager. The commercial bank
therefore maximizes its expected terminal net worth V CBt by picking its loan portfolio
and funding according to
V CBt = max{SCBt ,MCBt ,Dt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
τ=0
(
τ∏
i=0
βi
)
(1− θCB)θτCBΛt,t+τNCBt+τ , (8)
where the stochastic discount factor of the household is given by the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption today and tomorrow Λt,t+1 and the discount
factor βt. Since deposits only pay the risk free rate, a commercial bank has an
incentive to keep leveraging up as long as it earns more than Rt on its credit claims.
To motivate leverage endogenously, I introduce the incentive constraint by Gertler
and Karadi (2011) (GK11 from here on): Every period, a commercial bank can divert
a fraction λCB of its credit claims, which leads to the termination of the commercial
bank. Since in such a case depositors would lose their claims on the commercial bank,
they force the commercial bank to limit its leverage in such a way that motivates the
commercial bank to continue operations. A commercial bank is required to always
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maintain a value from continuing operations that is at least as high as the value it
would gain from defaulting:
V CBt ≥ λCB[QtSCBt + (1− λABS)MCBt ]. (9)
A commercial bank can divert a larger fraction of its real sector loans, which
are non-standardized, than of the commercial paper. Because commercial paper is a
claim on a broad pool of loans, its standardization makes it more pledgeable. This
is captured in the factor (1− λABS). As λABS approaches 1, a commercial bank can
reduce its funding constraint by shifting from outright lending to commercial paper,
thereby evading leverage restrictions. This captures the regulatory arbitrage motive
of off-balance sheet vehicles.
The solution to the commercial bank’s problem is derived in Appendix A.1 and
yields the balance sheet relation
QtS
CB
t +M
CB
t (1− λABS) = NCBt φCBt (10)
with endogenous leverage φCBt .
Since a constant fraction θCB of commercial banks exit each period, the remaining
commercial banks have a net worth of
NCBet = θCB(R
K
t Qt−1S
CB
t−1 +R
MCB
t M
CB
t−1 −RtDt−1). (11)
To make up for the outflow , households establish new commercial banks accord-
ing to
NCBnt = ω
CB(QtS
CB
t−1 +M
CB
t−1) (12)
with ωCB calibrated to pin down the steady state. The law of motion for commercial
bank net worth is the combination of both existing and new net worth NCBt =
NCBet ξ
CB
t + N
CB
nt . Existing commercial bank net worth may be affected by ξ
CB
t , an
autoregressive shock process of order one and mean 1.
2.2.2 Investment Funds
In addition to commercial bank deposits, households may save in fund shares. Fund
shares offer higher returns on average in order to attract investments, but are state-
contingent, since they are equity instruments. Infinitely many investment funds offer
fund shares that differ on the micro level with regards to characteristics like invest-
ment style and fund management. Similarly, individual household preferences differ
on the micro level with regard to the profile of an investment fund and individual
portfolio preferences. Because of these idiosyncratic differences, households need to
find a suitable fund, which takes time. Individual households and investment funds
meet on the funding market at random and evaluate the potential for a match in
isolation. I abstract from the mechanics on the micro level and approximate the
behavior on the macro level via search and matching: in aggregate a fraction qt of
all investment funds searching for funding will find an investing household. In order
to participate in the funding market, investment funds need to advertise their oper-
ations at a cost κ per advertisement vt. After forming a match, an investment fund
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is able to invest into either loans to the real sector SIFt or the commercial paper of
shadow banks M IFt .
In contrast to commercial banks, investment funds do not face the incentive con-
straint problem, since they do not leverage their operations with debt or deposits.
They lend out all acquired funding either to shadow banks or to the real economy.
Given their funding, they maximize returns subject to constraints that prohibit them
from investing more than a share ψIF of assets into commercial paper. Since com-
mercial paper from shadow banks pays a higher return than loans to the real sector
(see Equation (23)), investment funds generally invest into commercial paper up to
their constraint ψIF .
Each period, investment funds pay out a return RIFt to their investing household.
Some households will want to withdraw funding for consumption or alternative sav-
ings, while a fraction θIF keeps their existing fund shares. The value of an investment
fund that has formed a match is
V IF,Mt = −RIFt + ψIFRMIFt + (1− ψIF )RKt + θIFEtβt+1Λt,t+1V IF,Mt+1 , (13)
where RMIFt is the return on commercial paper holdings of investment funds. Invest-
ment funds searching for funding have a value
V IF,St = −κ+ qtEtβt+1Λt,t+1V IF,Mt+1 . (14)
Since operating an established investment fund is profitable, the value of oper-
ating an investment fund searching for funding may generally be profitable if the
second term in Equation (14) is larger than the search cost κ. Additional potential
investment funds searching for funding will therefore enter the funding market, which
depresses the average fund filling rate qt, until the value of a searching investment
fund is zero. A Euler condition for the number of fund advertisements can be derived:
κ
qt
= Etβt+1Λt,t+1
{
−RIFt + ψIFRMIFt + (1− ψIF )RKt +
κ
qt+1
θIF
}
. (15)
New fund advertisements are posted until the cost of establishing an investment
fund is equal to the return, which consists of the difference in interest income and
expenses, as well as the value from not having to look for funding in the next pe-
riod. The probability of finding a match is the number of realized matches mt per
advertisement15,
qt =
mt
vt
. (16)
The number of matches is determined by the number of fund advertisements as
well as the amounts households want to save. Since investment funds offer a higher
return than deposits pay, households always prefer to hold fund shares.16 The number
15The rate at which households find a suitable investment is the investment finding rate ft =
mt/Dt.
16The investment fund return is solved via Nash Bargaining and is derived in Appendix A.4.
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of matches therefore rises with the amount of household deposits and is determined
via a Cobb-Douglas matching function
mt = sD
ξ
t v
1−ξ
t (17)
with matching efficiency s and matching elasticity ξ.
2.2.3 Shadow Banks
Shadow banks are financial intermediaries that channel funding from commercial
banks and investment funds to the real sector. Commercial banks invest into shadow
banks via commercial paper MCBt , which is standardized and therefore more pledge-
able to the commercial bank creditors. Investment funds invest into the commercial
paper of shadow banks M IFt because they offer a high return. Accumulated earnings
in net worth NSBt retain the ’first loss’ of securitized assets. The amount of real
sector lending SSBt is
QtS
SB
t = M
CB
t +M
IF
t +N
SB
t . (18)
Since they are leveraged, shadow banks maximize terminal expected net worth
by choosing lending and funding sources according to
V SBt = max{SSBt ,MCBt ,MIFt }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
τ=0
(
τ∏
i=0
βi
)
(1− θSB)θτSBΛt,t+τNSBt+τ . (19)
Retained earnings NSBt+1 in a shadow bank are made up of the interest rate difference
that they make on loans and what they pay on commercial paper by commercial
banks and investment funds:
NSBt = R
K
t QtS
SB
t −RMIFt M IFt −RMCBt MCBt . (20)
As in Meeks et al. (2014), shadow banks structure some of their liabilities to
be extra safe, i.e., they pool their loans and attribute the safest returns to certain
creditors. These creditors are commercial banks, which need pledgeable securities to
circumvent their regulatory capital constraints. Only a fraction ψCB of all loans that
shadow banks grant meet this standard. The amount of loans that can be financed
via commercial paper held by commercial banks is therefore
MCBt ≤ ψCBQtSSBt . (21)
The solution to the shadow banks’ problem is derived in Appendix A.2 and yields
the balance sheet relation
QtS
SB
t =
NSBt +M
IF
t
1− ψCB . (22)
Since some loans remain unsecuritized and non-pledgeable, a portion of the
shadow bank balance sheets can not be funded by commercial bank holdings of
commercial paper. Demand by investment funds for commercial paper therefore in-
creases the lending operations of shadow banks. In order to incentivize investment
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funds to hold commercial paper rather than grant loans themselves, shadow banks
share the profit they receive from additional lending via Nash bargaining according
to
RMIFt = R
K
t + ζ
IF ψ
CB
1− ψCB (R
K
t −RMCBt ), (23)
where ζIF is the bargaining power of the investment fund. Just like commercial banks
and investment funds, a constant fraction θSB of shadow banks exit each period. The
remaining shadow banks have a net worth of
NSBet = θSB(R
K
t QtS
SB
t −RMIFt M IFt −RMCBt MCBt ). (24)
To make up for the outflow, new shadow banks are established according to
NSBnt = ω
SBQtS
SB
t−1 (25)
with ωSB calibrated to pin down the steady state. The law of motion for shadow bank
net worth is the combination of both existing and new net worth NSBt = N
SB
et ξ
SB
t +
NSBnt . Existing shadow bank net worth may be affected by ξ
SB
t , an autoregressive
shock process of order one and mean 1.
2.3 Goods Producers
The intermediaries are not productive by themselves and only derive profits from the
return on loans to goods producers. Perfectly competitive goods producers manufac-
ture intermediate goods and sell them to retailers at the relative intermediate output
price Pmt. After production, non-depreciated capital is sold to capital producers and
refurbished.17 Labor and capital for past production are remunerated and decisions
for new production are taken: The firm maximizes profits by solving
max
{Kt+1,Lt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
τ=0
(
τ∏
i=0
βi
)
Λt,t+τ
[
PmτYτ + (Qτ − δ)ξKτ Kτ −WτLτ −RkτKτQτ−1
]
with production output given by
Yt = At(ξ
K
t Kt)
αL1−αt (26)
where α is the capital share, Qt is the real price of capital, δ is the depreciation
rate, Wt are wages, At is a total factor productivity shock and ξ
K
t is a capital quality
shock. The first-order conditions are
RKt Qt = Pmtα
Yt
Kt
+ (Qt − δ)ξKt (27)
Pmt(1− α)Yt
Lt
= Wt. (28)
Firms pay out ex post returns to capital as interest payments, resulting in no
profits state by state. Since they pay the same interest rate RKt to all creditors, loans
by different intermediaries are perfect substitutes and do not enter the maximization
problem of the firm:
Kt+1 = S
CB
t + S
IF
t + S
SB
t . (29)
17Capital producer and retailer programs are discussed in Appendix A.3.
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2.4 Market Clearing, Resources and Policy
The aggregate resource constraint is given by consumption, investment and adjust-
ment costs
Yt = Ct + It + f
(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)
(Int + ISS). (30)
Capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = ξ
K
t Kt + Int, (31)
i.e., an autoregressive capital quality shock ξKt of order one captures the variability
of capital productivity inherent in fixed capital. Following the literature on the
importance of marginal efficiency of investment (Justiniano et al., 2010), investment
specific shocks ιt affect the transformation of gross investment into net investment.
Gross investment Int is
Int ≡ Itιt − δξtKt. (32)
Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule. The nominal interest rate is
given by it, with a steady state interest rate of iSS, the steady state value of output
given by YSS, an interest rate smoothing parameter ρi, the inflation coefficient κpi
and the output gap coefficient κy:
it = i
ρi
t−1
[
iSS(pit)
κpi
(
Yt
YSS
)κy]1−ρi
t (33)
The exogeneous shock to monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as t.
The nominal interest rate has an effect on the economy through the Fisher relation
1 + it = Rt+1Et(1 + pit+1), (34)
where Etpit+1 is expected future net inflation.
3 Model specification and analysis
In this section, I first pin down the model parameterization via calibration and
Bayesian estimation. Because I want to assess the model’s ability to replicate busi-
ness cycle statistics, I use a Bayesian estimation instead of minimizing the distance
between empirical and theoretical IRFs as in Christiano et al. (2005). Distance
minimization would be possible if empirical IRFs by the different intermediaries for
other key macroeconomic disturbances were available. A Bayesian estimation allows
a complementary analysis without these results and can be understood as a cross
validation for my empirical results: the model IRFs to monetary disturbances from
the estimated parameters are comparable to the empirical IRFs in Mazelis (2016).
Next, I analyze how monetary policy shocks propagate through the economy for
four different compositions of the financial system. Since only the financial sector
is reconfigured, but fundamentals of the model economy are unaffected, real sector
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credit demand is unchanged. The baseline case is the financial system with com-
mercial banks, shadow banks and investment funds, corresponding to the situation
before the financial crisis of 2008. Since then, shadow bank lending has declined
and been replaced by commercial bank and investment fund lending, which is at-
tributable to consolidation in the industry and new regulations. To show the effects
of different financial sector compositions, I consider three cases, one in which shadow
bank lending has been taken up by commercial banks, an alternative in which in-
vestment funds have taken up the credit demand, and one in which both sectors
share previously intermediated credit by shadow banks. The different relative sizes
of commercial banks to investment funds are due to changes in parameter values.
The affected parameter values are the proportional transfer to the entering bankers
ωCB, the proportional transfer to the entering shadow bankers ωSB, the fund’s sur-
vival rate θIF , the fund advertising cost κ, and the household bargaining power w.r.t.
funds ζHH . The model is solved via first order perturbation around the deterministic
steady state.
3.1 Parameterization
Several newly introduced parameters are calibrated to pre-crisis steady state values
or directly follow from their economic counterparts. Parameters that govern the
stochastic process as well as those that are not pinned down by steady state values
and that do not have a direct economic counterpart are estimated. Most of the
structural parameters present in GK11 are adopted here.
The pre-crisis economy includes a fully active shadow banking sector with a share
of lending of approximately 35%, while commercial banks lent 40%, and investment
funds lent the remaining 25% of credit.
The risk-free rate as measured by Shiller (1992) with updated values from his
website is 3 percentage points per year. This translates into a quarterly risk-free
rate of 75 basis points, i.e., iSS = .0075 assuming zero inflation in steady state. In
models featuring a conventional Euler equation this implies a higher discount factor
than β = 0.99, which is used in this calibration. However, note that if the additional
value from being invested in investment funds, µt, is positive, and if search frictions
guarantee that the finding rate ft ∈ (0, 1), then over-saving will result in a risk-free
rate that is lower than β−1.
The fraction of commercial bank assets invested in commercial paper by shadow
banks is set at 30%, as indicated in bank call report data reported in Meeks et al.
(2014). The corresponding fraction for investment fund assets is 40% pre-crisis as
indicated by Flows of Funds data.
Remaining model parameters are chosen to imply a spread for the borrowing
rate Rk − Rt of 79 bp, equal to the bank prime loan rate spread over the 3-month
Treasury Bill rate between 2001 and 2004. A spread of 109 bp as proxied by Moody’s
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield is chosen for the commercial paper rate that
shadow banks pay to investment funds. I assume that shadow banks belong to
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Symbol Value Description Source
Households
β 0.99 Steady state discount rate Gertler and Karadi (2011)
h 0.815 Habit parameter Gertler and Karadi (2011)
χ 3.409 Relative utility weight of labor Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Financial Sectors
iSS 0.0075 Quarterly nominal rate Shiller (1992)
ψCB 0.3 Fraction of commercial bank assets invested in commercial paper Meeks et al. (2014)
ψIF 0.4 Fraction of investment fund assets invested in commercial paper Flows of Funds
λABS 1 Relative divertibility of ABS Steady state
ζIF 0.88 Fund bargaining power re shadow banks Steady state
ζHH 0.86 Household bargaining power w.r.t. funds Steady state
ωCB 0.15 Proportional transfer to the entering bankers Steady state
ωSB 0.04 Proportional transfer to the entering shadow bankers Steady state
s .32 Matching efficiency Steady state
κ .0007 Search cost Steady state
Goods Producers
α 0.33 Effective capital share Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Retail Firms
 4.167 Elasticity of substitution Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γ 0.779 Probability of keeping prices fixed Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γp 0.241 Price indexation Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Government
κpi 1.5 Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule Gertler and Karadi (2011)
κy 0.125 Output gap coefficient of Taylor rule Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values. Note: ’steady state’ refers to parameter values
that directly follow from assumed steady state values. The steady state values are
either the relative share of the financial sector or interest rate differentials.
commercial banks and therefore do not pay a higher interest rate RMCBt than Rt.
This results in commercial paper held by commercial banks to be pledgable with a
λABS = 1, i.e., commercial banks can not divert these assets. It follows from the
steady state and parameter values that the bargaining power of investment funds vis-
a-vis shadow banks ζIF is then .88, since shadow banks need a buyer of remaining
loan pools. The fraction of new equity that has to be injected into commercial bank
and shadow bank equity, respectively, is ωCB = .15 and ωSB = .04. The matching
efficiency s, search costs κ and household bargaining power ζHH follows from the
steady state and parameter values. Table 1 shows the fixed structural parameter
values and their source.
The remaining parameters, including those governing the shock processes, are es-
timated using Bayesian methods. Commercial banks, investment funds and shadow
banks are defined as in Mazelis (2016): Commercial banks are US Depository In-
stitutions and Credit Unions. Shadow banks are ABS Issuers, Security Brokers and
Dealers, Financing Companies and Funding Corporations. Investment funds are
Mutual Funds and Money Market Funds. As a measure of credit I include loans,
bonds, and commercial paper. The macroeconomic time series underlying the data
for observables are: real GDP, the consumer price index, the federal funds rate, fixed
capital, household consumption, and credit by commercial banks, investment funds
and shadow banks (see Table 5 in Appendix C for details on the data sources). Since
the model is expressed in log-deviations from steady state, for estimation purposes
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Prior Posterior
Symbol Name Type Mean Std. Dev. Mean L.B. U.B.
Structural
ξ Matching elasticity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.74 0.66 0.84
λCB Commercial bank’s divertible share Beta 0.381 0.05 0.48 0.46 0.49
θCB Commercial bank’s survival rate Beta 0.75 0.05 0.63 0.57 0.68
θIF Investment fund’s survival rate Beta 0.75 0.05 0.74 0.68 0.80
θSB Shadow banker’s survival rate Beta 0.75 0.05 0.74 0.66 0.84
Persistence parameters
ρA TFP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.68 0.54 0.85
ρi Monetary Policy Beta 0.5 0.2 0.61 0.55 0.68
ρξ Capital Quality Beta 0.5 0.2 0.19 0.09 0.30
ρIS Investment Efficiency Beta 0.5 0.2 0.993 0.990 .998
ρβ Demand Beta 0.5 0.2 0.84 0.77 0.90
ρCB Commercial bank equity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.25 0.11 0.37
ρIF Investment fund equity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.74 0.68 0.80
ρSB Shadow bank equity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.78 0.71 0.84
Std dev.
eA TFP Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.012 0.007 0.017
ei Monetary Policy Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.003 0.002 0.004
eξ Capital Quality Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.012 0.011 0.014
eIS Investment Efficiency Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.013 0.011 0.015
eβ Demand Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.004 0.003 0.006
eCB Commercial bank equity Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.043 0.036 0.048
eIF Investment fund equity Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.054 0.040 0.067
eSB Shadow bank equity Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.200 0.166 0.226
Table 2: Priors and posteriors of estimated parameters. Note: L.B. is the lower
bound of the 90% highest posterior density interval. U.B. is the upper bound of the
90% highest posterior density interval.
I take the log difference from the one-sided HP filtered trend (smoothing parameter
is set to 1600) for all variables except inflation and the federal funds rate, which are
depicted in Figure 12 in Appendix C.3. The data have a quarterly frequency and
range from 1984:I to 2006:IV.
The priors for all persistence parameters are relatively uninformative Beta distri-
butions with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2. The priors for the white
noise processes on the innovations are Inverse Gamma distributions with means 0.01
standard deviations of 0.05. The shock processes are a priori independent. The
prior distributions for the structural parameters are beta distributions. The interval
for the matching elasticity allows all parameters between 0 and 1. The commercial
bank’s divertible share λCB is centered on the GK11 value of 0.381 and bound from
below and bound from above to limit commercial bank leverage. The intervals for
survival rates are between (0.5, 1.0).
I run 2 Monte Carlo Markov Chains with 100.000 draws each over the full sample
period. Convergence is reached after about 20.000 draws and I drop the first 50% of
estimated values. Table 2 shows the results. The posteriors of the shock processes are
informative (see Appendix C.3). In order to illuminate the dynamics of the matching
friction, I do a robustness analysis of the matching elasticity ξ in Appendix B.
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3.2 Response to a monetary policy shock
Figure 3 shows impulse response functions for key variables after unexpected mone-
tary policy tightening for the case of i) the original GK11 economy, ii) the baseline
case with investment funds and shadow banks, iii) the loans previously held by
shadow banks now intermediated by commercial banks (bank dependent), and iv)
the shadow bank loans intermediated by funds (fund dependent). The third case
corresponds to commercial banks granting 75% of all loans to the real economy,
while the last case has commercial banks intermediating a total of 40% of credit.
Investment funds intermediate the remaining share in the latter two cases.
First, consider the original GK11 economy. After an unexpected monetary tight-
ening of about 100 basis points in the first period, interest rates on commercial bank
deposits increase to encourage depositors to keep their savings with commercial banks
instead of shifting them into other assets. Because households have a higher incen-
tive to save, consumption drops. The reduction in consumption demand translates
into lower output and a reduction in the demand for physical capital by firms, which
also lowers the price for physical capital. Lower output and capital prices initially
diminish the return on capital for the firm, see Equation (27). Since firms pass this
return on as the borrowing cost to the intermediary, existing commercial bank prof-
its are hit. In the second period, the borrowing rate increases, because the price
for physical capital slowly rises from its initial low. Since the risk-free rate does not
increase by as much as the borrowing rate, the external finance premium (EFP) rises.
Equation (A.2) increases as the EFP rises, indicating gains from expanding assets for
commercial banks. This means that the reduction in lending is not just due to the
balance sheet channel, which would necessitate a drop in credit demand. Banks are
unable to quickly raise equity and soliciting more deposits from households would
cut into their margin. Credit to the real sector therefore drops.
The baseline case features shadow banks and investment funds. After a monetary
policy increase, the initial reaction in the economy is the same. However, commercial
banks now have the ability to leverage up on their existing net wealth by increasing
their investments into shadow banks, which lend on their behalf. At the same time,
commercial banks face competition from investment funds, which increase the fund
rate more aggressively than commercial banks increase the deposit rate. Households
therefore substitute away from commercial bank deposits and into investment fund
shares, which is consistent with empirical findings (Drechsler et al., 2016). Since
many previously creditworthy borrowers were pushed out of the market, investment
fund and shadow bank loans now replace some of the lost commercial bank credit.
The bank lending channel is therefore reduced, because the financial sector substi-
tutes away from bank deposits and into other funding options. This has a dampening
effect on the fall in physical capital, which is reduced two thirds less compared to
the GK11 economy with only commercial banks. The effect of the mitigated credit
crunch is a less pronounced recession.
Two additional cases describe what happens after elimination of the shadow bank-
ing system. If the credit previously intermediated by shadow banks is now granted
by commercial banks (the ’bank dependent’ scenario), there is no room for outright
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regulatory capital arbitrage by commercial banks anymore. Commercial banks there-
fore cut back on credit after monetary policy tightening, opening up the possibility
for investment funds to fill the excess credit demand. Investment funds do so by rais-
ing funding from households. Although investment funds increase lending by more
than 3%, the decrease in commercial bank borrowing is hardly offset, resulting in a
decrease in physical capital that is about twice as large as in the baseline case.
If instead investment funds intermediate the credit that was previously held by
shadow banks (the ’fund dependent’ scenario), capital reduction is comparable to
the bank dependent scenario. The behavior is the result of different mechanisms,
however. Shadow banks allow commercial banks to circumvent capital requirements
and raise more deposits than households would be willing to lend to commercial
banks themselves. In the case of large investment funds instead of shadow banks,
any losses are passed on to the households owning the fund shares. New investments
in investment funds still take place as households decrease consumption and allocate
their resources to savings, especially fund shares.
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Figure 3: Model IRFs to monetary policy tightening of 100 basis points. Note: The
black, solid lines report the IRFs from the model without NBFI, which is the basic GK
model. The blue, solid lines report IRFs from the full model including NBFI. The
green, dotted lines with cubes are responses for the baseline model without shadow
banks where commercial banks assume the excess credit demand. The orange, dashed
lines with diamonds are responses for the baseline model without shadow banks where
funds assume the excess credit demand. The horizontal axis reports quarters since the
shock. The vertical axis reports percentage deviations from the steady state (except
for the interest rates and the EFP, which are reported in percentage points).
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The behavior of shadow bank lending following a monetary policy tightening is
consistent with the literature. A monetary tightening in the model induces a drop in
commercial bank lending. In the BVAR in Mazelis (2016), commercial bank lending
contracts in a hump shaped fashion over six years. The increase in investment fund
and shadow bank loans in the empirical results are mirrored in the model reaction. A
resulting negative 0.6% in GDP in the BVAR is exactly reached in the model. The
difference is in timing. While the model reacts within the first couple of periods,
the empirical IRFs have a longer transmission period. For the sake of tractability, I
refrain from using any modeling devices that replicate empirical IRFs more closely.
Pescatori and Sole (2016), Nelson et al. (2015) and Igan et al. (2013) all show
empirically that some shadow banks increase lending after monetary policy tighten-
ing, while commercial banks reduce lending. Haan and Sterk (2011) show that both
mortgages and consumption credit by shadow banks increase following an increase in
the monetary policy rate. Finally, Altunbas et al. (2009) show that European banks
with more securitization activities reduce their lending by less than non-securitizing
banks after monetary tightening. European universal banks house both commercial
banking and shadow banking activities within the same group structure. This find-
ing is in line with understanding securitizing banks to be less affected by monetary
shocks because their shadow banking operations are larger, which insulates aggre-
gate group lending behavior by increasing shadow bank lending following monetary
policy tightening.
3.3 Business Cycle Effects
The benchmark economy with shadow banks compares well to second moments of
some key variables in the data. Table 3 shows a close fit for GDP and intermediary
credit standard deviations. Fixed capital is not as volatile as in the data, which
might be due to labor being fully flexible and absorbing volatility in the production
process. This might be fixed with model features like variable capital utilization and
either monopolistically competitive labor unions or a search and matching process
between firms and workers.
If shadow banks are eliminated, the volatility of aggregate variables necessarily
decreases because the stochastic process affecting shadow bank equity is eliminated.
The three counterfactual scenarios can therefore be compared among each other
but not to the baseline scenario. GDP and consumption are more volatile in fund-
heavy economies because households earn a state-contingent return on fund shares
instead of a non-contingent return on commercial bank deposits. Although this
makes consumption smoothing more difficult, it insulates the financial sector from
assuming losses. Passing on variable profits may increase financial stability by having
the ultimate equity holders help absorb fundamental shocks.
Apart from a change in second moments, variable means may also change.18
Since the fundamentals in the economy are not affected by the composition of the
18Deterministic steady states are studied, which ignore precautionary savings, to guarantee com-
parability among model variants.
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Shadow bank loans held by
Variable Data Baseline Banks Split 50/50 Funds
GDP 1.26 1.45 1.21 1.25 1.33
Inflation .79 .56 .44 .44 .48
Consumption .73 1.09 .91 .92 .95
Physical capital 4.28 2.57 2.32 2.36 2.42
Commercial bank loans 5.76 5.51 6.65 6.60 7.11
Investment fund loans 7.44 7.28 15.46 8.39 5.16
Shadow bank loans 5.86 5.72 – – –
Table 3: Second moments of data and model variants (all numbers in %). Note:
Second moments for the data are calculated from cyclical variations around the one-
sided HP filtered log data from 1984:I to 2006:IV. Second moments for the model
variants are based on shock processes as estimated in Section 3.1.
financial system, real economy variable means are unchanged. Instead, funding of
the financial sector moves into the spotlight. In a more bank-dependent economy,
commercial banks have to increase their deposit base by about 25%. This benefits
households by increasing their total return from deposits by about 35%. Without
shadow banks, however, regulatory arbitrage is not possible and commercial banks
have to increase their equity holdings by about 80%. This increase in equity is
arguably better for the stability of the financial sector, but it does beg the question
whether commercial banks would be able to raise the required capital following a
financial crisis.
In the case that the economy becomes more fund-dependent, commercial bank
deposits diminish. Instead, fund share holdings are increased by about 40%, while
commercial bank equity stays the same. This increases total fund returns to house-
holds, while decreasing total returns to deposits. The net result is a slightly higher
total return for households from financial assets compared to the baseline case, and a
5 percentage point increase above the bank-dependent scenario. The reason for this
is that fund returns are stochastic and therefore have to remunerate the investor for
uncertainty.
4 Shadow bank regulation at the zero lower bound
Before the financial crisis, the shadow banking system contributed about 35% of
credit to the real economy. This share has dropped significantly since 2007 (see
Figure 9 in Appendix C). The shadow banking system has been the explicit focus
of financial regulation in many countries around the world, see Financial Stability
Board (2013) for an overview. Although no consensus has emerged, the dominant
principle has been to bring credit intermediation out of the shadows. This means
that shadow banks would either be differently regulated, or that they cease to exist
and that the credit demand they previously intermediated would be assumed by
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other institutions. In effect, the options then are to regulate this credit demand like
commercial bank credit, like investment funds, or a combination of those. At the
same time, many of those same economies have been plagued by the ZLB on nominal
interest rates. Central banks and governments are actively trying to escape the ZLB
with different measures and varying success. This section studies how an economy
behaves under different financial intermediary regimes during a prolonged time at
the ZLB.
4.1 Technical specifications
A ZLB on nominal interest rates means that the central bank cannot set the net
monetary policy rate below 0, which amounts to an occasionally binding constraint.
Formally, this changes the Taylor rule, equation (33), to
it =
iρit−1
[
iSS(pit)
κpi
(
Yt
YSS
)κy]1−ρi
t , if it > 0
0 , otherwise.
(35)
Since this induces non-linearities in the policy functions of economic agents, I use
the method developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to find an approximated
solution. The utilized ”OccBin” toolbox considers an economy with two regimes,
the ”reference” regime in which the monetary policy rate follows a linearized Taylor
rule and the ”alternative” regime in which it is constant at zero. A piecewise-linear
solution is then found by considering the reference regime where the constraint is
slack until the monetary policy rate reaches its lower bound. Once the lower bound
is reached, the regime switches to the alternative where the constraint is binding
until the reference regime indicates a move away from the constraint.
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Figure 4: Monetary policy path after negative demand shocks. Note: The blue, solid
line refers to an economy constrained by the zero lower bound on monetary policy.
The black, dotted line represents the case for the same economy unconstrained. The
horizontal axis shows periods in quarters. The vertical axis is the net policy rate in
annualized percentage points.
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A common way of analyzing the ZLB in theoretical models is to assume prefer-
ence shocks19 that elicit households to forego consumption today, see also Christiano
et al. (2011) and Fernndez-Villaverde et al. (2015). Following this literature, I turn
monetary policy smoothing off (ρi = 0). In addition, I increase price rigidity to
γ = 0.9 and the Taylor rule coefficient for inflation to κpi = 2.5 as in Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2015). These changes limit the use of disinflation in order to escape the
ZLB, which is in line with the current ZLB experience. Following the drop in de-
mand, output and inflation fall. This prompts the monetary authority to lower the
policy rate until it reaches zero.
The discount factor receives an innovation of β = 0.06, which decreases output
by 4 percent in a ZLB environment, comparable to the drop in GDP in 2008, (see
the cyclical variation in the GDP panel in 2009, Figure 12 in Appendix C.3). The
monetary authority reacts by lowering the policy rate, see Figure 4. Without the
ZLB (black, dotted line), the policy rate would drop below zero for 8 quarters. An
unconstrained policy would stimulate investment by lowering borrowing costs, while
also limiting household incentives to save. With a ZLB, the economy never receives
this feedback and is instead stuck with a policy rate that is above its desired level.
Commercial banks Investment funds Shadow banks
i) Historical case 40% 25% 35%
ii) Bank dependent case 75% 25% –
iii) Fund dependent case 40% 60% –
Table 4: Loan shares under different regulatory scenarios. Note: The historical
case corresponds roughly to the shares of fixed income securities to the real sector
in 2006. The bank dependent case refers to credit previously held by shadow banks
to be intermediated by commercial banks. The fund dependent case assumes that all
shadow bank credit is lent out by investment funds.
4.2 Implications of different shadow bank regulations
As explained in Section 3.2, bank credit decreases in response to monetary policy
tightening due to the bank lending channel. However, shadow banks and investment
funds increase lending. This behavior suggests that a policy rate above its natural
level is conducive for NBFI lending. Furthermore, it begs the question whether an
economy with a larger share of aggregate credit coming from NBFI may be less af-
fected by a policy rate above its natural level. To answer this question, I analyze the
response of the economy under three different scenarios: i) the historical case with
commercial banks, investment funds and shadow banks under the baseline parame-
terization; ii) the bank dependent case in which shadow banks are eliminated and the
19Although the financial crisis of 2008 has its roots in the financial sector, a negative household
demand shock captures the reaction to the destruction in household wealth that followed the drop
in real estate values as well as the effects on household asset holdings in financial firms.
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excess credit demand is taken up by commercial banks; and iii) the fund dependent
case in which investment funds take on all of the loans previously intermediated by
shadow banks. The first case is ’historical’ in the sense that a large shadow banking
system was intact prior to the crisis but has mostly evaporated since. Shadow banks
are likely to be more heavily regulated going forward. The last case assumes that
several regulatory proposals that favor the capital market based credit system over
the bank based one are enacted. This approach is currently being taken in Europe
with the Capital Markets Union expected to allow NBFI to increase their market
share. Table 4 summarizes the loan shares for the three cases.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of key variables for the case in which the ZLB is
binding (left hand side) and in which the policy rate is unconstrained (right hand
side). Consider the historical case with a shadow banking system intact (blue, solid
line) with an unconstrained monetary policy. An increase in the household discount
factor induces households to consume less and save more. To counter this develop-
ment, monetary policy is reduced, thereby lowering the real rate, which stimulates
investments. The additional credit is supplied by banks, which face reduced financing
costs via deposits. A deep recession can be avoided by quickly lowering the policy
rate.
Next, consider the historical case under the ZLB (blue line in the left hand panels).
While the economy suffers from inadequate demand, the policy rate is bound at
zero. The real rate can therefore not fall enough to stimulate investment and in
fact rises, since the drop in demand results in deflation. This causes commercial
banks to decrease lending, because their supply of loanable funds decreases. As a
result, only the most creditworthy firms (i.e., those with a high marginal return on
capital) can keep borrowing. Although some credit is channeled via shadow banks,
and investment funds receive an inflow in funding because they pay a higher expected
return than deposits, credit does not increase enough to counter the drop in demand.
A negative 4% drop in output follows, which is comparable to the recession following
the recent financial crisis. This scenario is no longer applicable, since the financial
crisis caused many shadow banks to go out of business, thereby eliminating the
opportunity for commercial banks to channel funds off their own balance sheets.
Credit previously held by shadow banks is now taken on by commercial banks
or investment funds. The bank dependent case (green, dotted line with squares)
illustrates the first scenario. Since commercial banks’ supply of loanable funds is
decreasing, they are reluctant to grant credit and they cut back on lending. Invest-
ment funds receive an inflow in funding, as households earn more from fund shares
than commercial bank deposits. Since investment funds pass on the lower profits
from depressed borrowing rates, they still profit from additional lending and there-
fore increase credit intermediation. Although additional investment fund lending
counteracts the reduction in commercial bank lending somewhat, it is not sufficient
to generate enough investment to stop the recession. The economy unconstrained by
a ZLB does not suffer such a sharp recession, as commercial banks do not scale back
lending as much due to the cheap refinancing via negative real rates. Following the
ZLB episode, commercial banks slowly reverse credit intermediation back to steady
state levels. At the same time, investment funds reduce lending as the policy rate is
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Figure 5: Paths of key variables after a prolonged time at the ZLB for different
regulatory regimes. Note: The left panels show paths for key variables under the
ZLB constraint. The right hand panels show paths for unconstrained economies.
Horizontal axes show periods in quarters, vertical axes are percentage deviations from
steady state.
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back to its natural level.
Finally, consider the case in which investment funds provide the largest share
of credit (orange, dashed line with diamonds). Again commercial bank lending is
reduced, following a reduction in funding. However, lending by investment funds
increases sufficiently to motivate enough investments for a prolonged period. The
reason for this is that in steady state households are less invested in deposits and
the rebalancing into fund shares is less pronounced. This reduces the impact of the
lending channel and allows more firms to invest into capital. These investments keep
GDP from dropping as much as in the bank dependent scenario and allow for a less
severe recession compared to the bank dependent case.
4.3 A demand shock at the ZLB initiates the bank lending
channel
The more favorable dynamics of a less bank-based credit system during a ZLB episode
can be explained via the bank lending channel of monetary policy. In order to
better understand this result, consider the Euler equation (4) with the value of fund
investments, Equation (5), inserted in the last term on the right hand side:
%t = (1− ft)Etβt+1Rt+1%t+1 + ftEtβt+1
{
RIFt+1%t+1 + µt+1θIF ξ
IF
t+1
}
. (36)
The economic disturbance that hits the economy in this exploration is a large
demand shock that increases the household discount factor. Households reduce cur-
rent period consumption until the marginal utility of consumption rises to equal the
right hand side of the Euler condition. To limit incentives for households to save,
the monetary authority reduces the policy rate, lowering the real rate Rt+1 in an
economy unconstrained by the ZLB. This results in additional investments and, con-
sequently, aggregate demand only suffers slightly. If the economy is constrained by
the ZLB, the policy rate cannot counter the increase in the first term on the right
hand side of the Euler condition. Current period consumption has to drop further to
satisfy a higher marginal utility of consumption. The second component of aggregate
demand, investment, does not rise enough to counter this development, since the real
interest rate cannot fall to the unconstrained level. Because of deflation, the real rate
even rises. A much more pronounced recession is the result.
The increase in the real rate is likewise the reason for the bank lending channel
becoming operational in the case of a demand shock at the ZLB. This can be seen
by taking the differences of the variable responses in case of the ZLB versus the
unconstrained paths, which removes the effects purely due to the demand shock.
Figure 6 shows these IRFs. The ’shock’ in this diagram is due to the monetary
authority’s inability to lower the policy rate by an additional two percentage points
after the demand shock hits. The reactions of most other variables are then similar
to the case of monetary policy tightening in Section 3.2.
Now consider the second term in the right hand side of the Euler condition. If
households can easily find investment funds as an alternative to deposits, the fund
finding rate ft is higher and the weight on the first term on the right hand side is
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Figure 6: Differences in reactions of the ZLB and unconstrained models to a demand
shock. Note: The blue, solid lines report IRFs from the full model including NBFI.
The green, dotted lines with cubes are responses for the baseline model without shadow
banks where commercial banks assume the excess credit demand. The orange, dashed
lines with diamonds are responses for the baseline model without shadow banks where
funds assume the excess credit demand. The horizontal axis reports quarters since the
shock. The vertical axis reports percentage deviations from the steady state (except
for the interest rates and the EFP, which are reported in percentage point deviations).
smaller. The inability of the monetary authority to lower the policy rate does not
affect the economy as much. Instead, the focus shifts to the reaction of variables in
the second term, the fund rate RIFt+1 and the additional value from being invested
in fund shares µt+1. In a bank-dependent credit economy, both variables increase
strongly following the activation of the bank lending channel, because funds are able
to strongly raise the fund rate they pay on shares. In a fund-dependent economy,
there are already many funds in operation and many households invested in them.
Therefore funds have a reduced incentive to increase the fund rate.20
The fund-based economy can be interpreted as one in which households have
already exhausted most options for higher yielding, non-depository assets. The acti-
vation of the bank lending channel then has little effect on the funding supply of the
economy. Alternatively, in a bank based economy, households rebalance their port-
folios towards higher yielding assets, which increases the effectiveness of the bank
lending channel. The reduction in credit is not desirable while the policy rate is at
the ZLB. This can be countered by lowering the effectiveness of the bank lending
channel through more non-depository sources of funding.
20Additional households on the funding market are a positive externality for searching funds, but
seen as congestion from the perspective of other searching households, see Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001).
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5 Conclusions
The reactions of different financial intermediaries can be explained in a monetary
DSGE model. Shadow banks are associated with commercial banks to circumvent
regulatory restrictions and continue lending in otherwise unfavorable circumstances.
Investment funds on the other hand experience funding inflows during contractionary
episodes, because they raise their payouts in line with policy tightening. This also
allows investment funds to increase lending overall. A subsequent counter factual
analysis in the DSGE model shows that eliminating shadow banks has different
effects, depending on how the remaining financial system is regulated. If commercial
banks pick up the credit previously supplied by shadow banks, consumption volatility
is reduced. However, large investments into commercial bank equity have to precede
this option. If instead investment funds are taking up the additional credit demand,
consumption is more volatile, resulting from the state-contingent return that fund
investments pay out. Total returns from financial assets are also higher in this
case, as households are compensated with a risk premium. Allocating losses to the
ultimate equity holders instead of concentrating them in the financial sectors may
have additional benefits for financial stability that go beyond the scope of this paper.
A key advantage of having a fund-dependent financial sector comes from the be-
havior at the ZLB. Because households decrease deposit holdings, banks cut lending,
thereby starving the economy of necessary credit. Investment funds benefit from a
higher real rate in contrast to commercial banks as they experience a funding inflow
from savers. This inflow is translated into more loans that partially make up for
the loss in commercial bank credit. The effectiveness of the bank lending channel is
therefore reduced, which is beneficial during a ZLB episode. Although a recession
cannot be avoided, the drop in GDP is not as deep, and the return to steady state
levels occurs more quickly when the credit economy is funded less by deposits and
more by fund shares.
The policy implications that follow from this analysis contribute towards the
debate on the composition and size of the financial sector. Shadow banking in the
sense of regulatory arbitrage as treated here will likely be strongly contained in the
regulatory overhaul currently discussed in various countries. Since the void will
have to be filled with credit coming from different sources, this paper suggests some
business cycle implications for credit systems that are more bank based as compared
to more fund based ones.
In order to escape the ZLB, this analysis favors a fund-dependent financial sys-
tem, as the effectiveness of the bank lending channel is reduced. The paper therefore
supports current plans in the European Union to increase the size of the market
based financial system on the basis of an increased resilience to ZLB issues. How-
ever, in order to make more comprehensive suggestions, a detailed analysis based on
European data and financial system configurations would need to follow.
The same argument that favors fund based credit systems during ZLB episodes
might speak in favor of a bank based system outside the ZLB. The bank lending
channel is more effective in a more deposit based credit system, i.e., credit will react
more strongly to monetary policy. This may be desirable, if the monetary authority
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wants to stave off a potential recession by lowering the policy rate and stimulating
credit. Whether one credit system dominates the other therefore depends on the
frequency at which monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB.
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A Appendix: Model Derivation
A.1 Solution to the Commercial Bank’s Problem
Substituting Dt in Equation (7) from Equation (6), the ongoing value of a commercial
bank Equation (8) can be expressed recursively as
V CBt = ν
SB
t QtS
CB
t + ν
MCB
t M
CB
t + η
CB
t N
CB
t (A.1)
with the marginal benefit from extending loans νCBt given by
νCBt = Et{(1− θCB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RKt+1 −Rt+1) + βt+1Λt,t+1θCBxCBt+1νCBt+1}, (A.2)
where xCBt+1 is the gross growth rate of assets Qt+1S
CB
t+1/QtS
CB
t . Similarly, the marginal
benefit from extending commercial paper νMCBt given by
νMCBt = Et{(1− θCB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RMt+1 −Rt+1) + βt+1Λt,t+1θCBxMCBt+1 νMCBt+1 }, (A.3)
where xMCBt+1 is the gross growth rate of commercial paper M
CB
t+1/M
CB
t . The marginal
benefit from extending net worth ηCBt is
ηCBt = Et{(1− θCB)βt+1Λt,t+1Rt+1 + βt+1Λt,t+1θCBzCBt+1ηCBt+1, (A.4)
and the gross growth rate of net worth zCBt+1 = N
CB
t /N
CB
t−1 .
Together with the incentive constraint in Equation (9), the Lagrangian can be
written
L = V CBt + µCBt [V CBt − λCB(QtSCBt + [1− λABS]MCBt )]
= (1 + µCBt )(ν
CB
t QtS
CB
t + ν
MCB
t M
CB
t + η
CB
t N
CB
t )− µCBt λCB(QtSCBt + [1− λABS]MCBt ).
The first order conditions with respect to SCBt , M
CB
t and µ
CB
t are, respectively,
(1 + µCBt )ν
CB
t = µ
CB
t λ
CB (A.5)
(1 + µCBt )ν
MCB
t = µ
CB
t λ
CB[1− λABS] (A.6)
QtS
CB
t (ν
CB
t − λCB) +MCBt (νMCBt − λCB[1− λABS]) + ηCBt NCBt = 0. (A.7)
Equations (A.5) and (A.6) result in νMCBt = ν
CB
t [1 − λABS], which can be sub-
stituted into Equation (A.7) to yield
QtS
CB
t +M
CB
t (1− λABS) = NCBt φCBt , (A.8)
with the endogenous leverage variable given by
φCBt =
ηCBt
λCB − νCBt
. (A.9)
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A.2 Solution to the Shadow Bank’s Problem
Substituting MCBt in Equation (20) from Equation (18), the ongoing value of a
shadow bank Equation (19) can be expressed recursively as
V SBt = ν
SS
t QtS
SB
t − νMFt M IFt + ηSBt NSBt (A.10)
with the marginal benefit from extending loans νSBt given by
νSSt = Et{(1− θSB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RKt+1 −RMCBt+1 ) + βt+1Λt,t+1θSBxSSt+1νSSt+1}, (A.11)
where xSSt+1 is the gross growth rate of assets Qt+1S
SB
t+1/QtS
SB
t . Similarly, the marginal
benefit from increasing funding by commercial paper held by investment funds is νMFt
given by
νMFt = Et{(1− θSB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RMIFt+1 −RMCBt+1 ) + βt+1Λt,t+1θSBxMFt+1 νMFt+1 }, (A.12)
where xMFt+1 is the gross growth rate of commercial paper M
IF
t+1/M
IF
t . The marginal
benefit from extending net worth ηSBt is
ηSBt = Et{(1− θSB)βt+1Λt,t+1RMCBt+1 + βt+1Λt,t+1θSBzSBt+1ηSBt+1, (A.13)
and the gross growth rate of net worth zSBt+1 = N
SB
t+1/N
SB
t .
Together with the incentive constraint in Equation (21), the Lagrangian can be
written
L = V SBt + µSBt [V SBt − ψCB(M IFt + [1− λABS]MCBt )]
= (1 + µSBt )(ν
SS
t QtS
SB
t − νMFt MSBt + ηSBt NSBt )− µSBt ψCB(QtSSBt [1− λABS] + λABSM IFt ).
The first order conditions with respect to SSBt , M
IF
t and µ
SB
t are, respectively,
(1 + µSBt )ν
SS
t = µ
SB
t ψ
CB(1− λABS) (A.14)
(1 + µSBt )ν
MF
t + µ
SB
t ψ
CBλABS = 0 (A.15)
QtS
SB
t (ν
SS
t − ψCB[1− λABS])−M IFt (νMFt + ψCBλABS) +NSBt (ηSBt + ψCB[1− λABS] = 0.
(A.16)
Equations (A.14) and (A.15) result in νMFt = −νSSt λ
ABS
1−λABS , which can be substi-
tuted into Equation (A.16) to yield
QtS
SB
t = N
SB
t
ηSBt + ψ
CB(1− λABS)
ψCB(1− λABS)− νSS −M
IF
t
λABS
1− λABS . (A.17)
A.3 Capital producers and retailers
Following GK11, capital producers buy leftover capital from goods producers which
they refurbish, for which the price is unity. Units of new capital are made using input
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of final output and are then sold to goods producers at Qt, which capital producers
set by solving
max
Int
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tt Λt,τ
{
(Qτ − 1)Inτ − f
(
Inτ + ISS
Inτ−1 + ISS
)
(Inτ + ISS)
}
with
Int ≡ Itιt − δξtKt. (A.18)
Following the literature on the importance of marginal efficiency of investment
(Justiniano et al., 2010), investment specific shocks ιt affect the transformation of
gross investment into net investment. The functional form of f(.) obeys f(1) =
f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) > 0. f(.) determines capital adjustment costs with the steady
state value for investments given by ISS. The capital producer thus creates profits
outside of the steady state. Households receive profits from sales of new capital at
price Qt, which is given by the first-order condition
Qt = 1 + f(.) +
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
f ′(.)− EtβtΛt,t+1
(
Int+1 + ISS
Int + ISS
)2
f ′(.). (A.19)
Retailers buy intermediate goods from goods producers at the relative interme-
diate output price Pmt. Final output is the CES composite of a continuum of output
by each retailer f with the elasticity of substitution , given by
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
−1

ft df
] 
−1
.
Because users of final output minimize costs, we get
Yft =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ft df
] 1
1−
.
Each retailer can reset prices with probability 1 − γ each period. Retailers will
otherwise index their prices to lagged inflation. The retailers then choose their reset
price P ∗t optimally to solve
max
P ∗t
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβitΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − Pmt+i
]
Yft+i.
The first-order condition is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβitΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − 
− 1Pmt+i
]
Yft+i = 0. (A.20)
The evolution of the price level is given by
Pt = [(1− γ)(P ∗t )1− + γ(Πγpt−1Pt−1)1−]1/(1−). (A.21)
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A.4 Interest Rate Bargaining
Households and investment funds share the joint value they derive from having es-
tablished a match via Nash bargaining according to the household bargaining power
ζHH . Interest rates are negotiated that maximize a convex combination of the sur-
pluses,
RIFt+1 = argmax ζ
HH lnV HHt + (1− ζHH)lnV IFt .
The household value V HHt is made up of the value of owning a fund share V
HH,e
versus saving deposits at a commercial bank V HH,u:
V HH,et = R
IF
t + Etβt+1Λt,t+1[θV
HH,e
t+1 + (1− θ)V HH,ut+1 ]
V HH,ut = Rt + Etβt+1Λt,t+1[ftV
HH,e
t+1 + (1− ft)V HH,ut+1 ].
Together they make up the household value
V HHt = R
IF
t −Rt + Etβt+1Λt,t+1(θ − ft)V HHt+1 . (A.22)
From the first-order condition for interest rate bargaining I know that
ζHH
V HHt
=
(1− ζHH)
V IFt
.
Solving this forward one period and substituting into Equation (A.22), as well as
inserting Etβt+Λt,t+1V IFt+1 = κ/qt from Equation (14), I get for the return investment
funds have to pay on their shares
RIFt = Rt + ζ
HH
{
ψIFRMIFt + (1− ψIF )RKt −Rt + κ
ft
qt
}
.
Note that investment funds can get away with paying only the risk-free deposit rate in
case that they have all the bargaining power. The interest rate on investment shares
rises with the bargaining power of households, guaranteeing at least the risk-free
rate.
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B Robustness Analysis
This section analyzes the robustness of the results of the paper with regard to key
parameter values. All of the parameters either come from the literature, are cali-
brated to fit steady state values, or are estimated. However, the analysis of especially
newly introduced parameters facilitates the understanding of the model extension.
B.1 Matching elasticity ξ
The parameter for matching elasticity ξ is important for the dynamics of the match-
ing friction. The value is determined by the Bayesian estimation as 0.74 with rela-
tively narrow posterior density intervals. However, there is no a priori reason why
the value could not be lower. In order to test whether the results depend on the
value of the matching elasticity, Figure 7 shows the response of the economy to the
same monetary tightening as in Section 3.2 for the different configurations of the
financial sector but a matching elasticity of ξ = 0.2. In this case, household savings
play a larger part in establishing new matches.
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Figure 7: IRFs to a monetary tightening of 100bp and the matching elasticity ξ = .2.
The baseline scenario (blue, solid line) is almost unchanged, because investment
funds only make up 25% of the credit economy. However, in the bank dependent
scenario (green, dotted line), investment funds increase their intermediation by more
than with a lower elasticity. This is so because households can more quickly substi-
tute out of deposits and into higher yielding assets.
In the fund dependent case (orange line with diamonds), investment fund lending
increases more persistently than with a higher elasticity. This leads to an even milder
reduction in aggregate lending than in the baseline case. Remarkably, aggregate
lending even turns positive after 15 periods.
In order to study the ZLB case, taking the differences of the responses to a
demand shock for constrained and unconstrained monetary policy as in Section 4.3
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leads to the reactions in Figure 8. The baseline case is not changed much, and the
bank dependent case is qualitatively similar to a higher elasticity. However, the fund
dependent case without shadow banks now shows a reaction that is as favorable as
the baseline case with shadow banks.
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Figure 8: Difference of IRFs to demand shocks under the ZLB and unconstrained
monetary policy. Matching elasticity ξ = .2.
The robustness analysis shows that the results in the main body of the text can
be taken as a lower bound for the reaction of the fund dependent case, while there
is not a lot of variation in the baseline and bank dependent cases. The Bayesian
estimation provides a narrow standard deviation for the posterior of the matching
elasticity. However a quantitative study (e.g., in the case of a welfare analysis) would
benefit from further evidence for the exact matching parameter, as the results may
change.
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C Empirical Resources
C.1 Data Sources
Variables Description Source
Aggregate Output Yt Real Gross Domestic Product, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Consumption Ct Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
and Nondurable Goods, USD, not s.a.
Stock and Watson (2012)
Physical Capital Kt Real Private Fixed Investment, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
M2 Money Supply M2SL, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Total Reserves TOTRES, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Non-borrowed Reserves NBRES, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Inflation pit Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All
Items
Stock and Watson (2012)
Index of sentitive materials prices Stock and Watson (2012)
Federal Funds Rate it Effective Federal Funds Rate Stock and Watson (2012)
Commercial Bank Loans St Fixed income credit to the real sector
21 of U.S.-
chartered depository institutions and credit unions,
USD, not s.a.
Financial accounts of the United States
Investment Fund Loans SIFt Fixed income credit to the real sector of Money mar-
ket funds, Mutual Funds, USD, not s.a.
Financial accounts of the United States
Shadow bank Loans SSBt Fixed income credit to the real sector of ABS Issuers,
Financing Companies, Funding Corporations, Secu-
rity Brokers and Dealers, USD, not s.a.
Financial accounts of the United States
Table 5: Data sources and definitions
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Figure 10: Response of all variables to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Note: Empirical impulse responses of all variables to an unanticipated 100 basis
point increase in the effective federal funds rate. The horizontal axis reports quarters
since the shock. The vertical axis reports percentage deviations from the unshocked
path. Shaded regions are 32nd-68th and 5th-95th percentiles of 1000 draws.
C.2 Full Bayesian VAR
C.3 Bayesian Estimation
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Figure 11: Posteriors for the standard deviations and persistances of shock processes,
and structural parameters. Note: Bayesian estimation with data from 1984:I to
2006:IV. Posteriors are based on 2 chains of 100.000 draws each. I drop the first
50.000 values of each chain.
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Figure 12: Data: Unfiltered, trend component (via one-sided HP filter), cyclical component. Note: Vertical axes are pecentage
points divided by 100 for cyclical variations and log data for data and trends.
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